A popular methodology for building binary decision-making classifiers in the presence of imperfect information is to first construct a non-binary "scoring" classifier that is calibrated over all protected groups, and then to post-process this score to obtain a binary decision. We study the feasibility of achieving various fairness properties by post-processing calibrated scores, and then show that deferring post-processors allow for more fairness conditions to hold on the final decision. Specifically, we show:
Introduction
The concept of fairness is deeply ingrained in our psyche as a fundamental, essential ingredient of Human existence. Indeed the perception of fairness, broadly construed as accepting each others' equal right for well being, is arguably one of the most basic tenets of cooperative societies of individuals in general, and Human existence in particular.
However, as fundamental as this concept may be, it is also extremely elusive: different societies have developed very different notions of fairness and equality among individuals, subject to different religious, ethical, and social beliefs; in particular, the intricate interplay between fairness and justice, which is yet another somewhat elusive concept, is often not well-defined and a matter of subjective interpretation.
The concept is further complicated by the fact that human decisions are often made with incomplete information and limited resources. These two factors must be taken into account when evaluating whether decision-making processes are "fair." Indeed, these two aspects of the problem have become increasingly prominent as societies grow and decision processes become more complex and algorithmic.
One way that researchers are responding to these growing concerns is by attempting to formulate precise notions for fairness of decisions processes, e.g. [DHP + 11, KMR16] . While these notions do not intend to capture the complexities of the ethical, socio-economic, or religious aspects of fairness, they do consider the fairness aspects of statistical decision-making processes with incomplete information. Essentially, these notions accept the fact that a decision process with incomplete information will inevitably make errors relative to the desired full-information notion (which is treated as a given), and provide guidelines on how to "distribute the errors fairly" across individuals, or alternatively across groups of individuals. These definitions have proven to be meaningful and eye opening; in particular, it has been demonstrated that some very natural notions of "fair distribution of errors" are mutually inconsistent: No decision mechanism with incomplete information can satisfy all, except for in trivial cases [Cho17, KMR16] .
Faced with this basic impossibility, we would like to better understand the process of decision making with incomplete information, and use this understanding to propose ways to circumvent this impossibility.
Specifically, we concentrate on the task of post-processing a calibrated soft classifier under group fairness constraints. We suppose that individuals belong to one of two or more disjoint protected groups. Our overall task is to decide whether a given individual has some hidden binary property B in a way that ensures "fair balancing of errors" across the groups.
For that purpose, we consider the following two-stage mechanism. The first stage consists of constructing a classifierŜ that outputs for each individual x a score s ∈ [0, 1] that is related to the chance that x has property B. The only requirement we make ofŜ is group-wise calibration: for both g 1 and g 2 , and for each s ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of individuals in the group that get score s and have the property, out of all individuals in the group that get score s, is s. The second stage takes as input the output s =Ŝ(x) of the first stage and the group to which x belongs, and outputs a binary decision: its best guess at whether x has property B.
An attractive aspect of this two-stage mechanism is that each stage can be viewed as aimed at a different goal: The first stage is aimed at gathering information and providing the best accuracy possible, with only minimal regard to fairness (i.e only group-wise calibration). The second stage is aimed to extract a decision from the information collected in the first stage, while making sure that the errors are distributed "fairly."
To further focus our study, we take the first stage as a given and concentrate on the second. That is, we consider the problem of post-processing the scores given by the calibrated soft classifier S into binary predictions. A representative example is a judge making a bail decision based on a score provided by a software package. Following [Cho17, HPS16] we consider the following four performance measures for the resulting binary classifier: the positive predictive value (PPV), namely the fraction of individuals that have the property among all individuals that the classifier predicted to have the property; The false positive rate (FPR), namely the fraction of individuals that were predicted to have the property among all individuals that don't have the property; The negative predictive value (NPV) and false negative rate (FNR), which are defined analogously. Ideally, we would like to equalize each one of the four measures across the groups, i.e. the measure will have the same value when restricted to samples from each group. Unfortunately, however, we know that this is impossible in general [Cho17, KMR16] . This leads us to a broad question that motivates our work:
Under what conditions can we post-process a calibrated soft classifier's outputs so that the resulting hard classifier equates a subset of {PPV, NPV, FNR, FPR} across a set of protected groups? How can we balance these conflicting goals?
Results: Post-Processing With Thesholds In a first set of results we consider the properties obtained by post-processing via a "threshold" mechanism. Naively, a threshold post-processing mechanism would return 1 for individual x whenever s(x) is above some fixed threshold, and return 0 otherwise. We somewhat extend this mechanism by allowing the post-processor "fine-tune" its decision by choosing the output probabilistically whenever the result of the soft classifier is exactly the threshold.
We show that no post-processing mechanism that uses a single threshold across all groups can guarantee equality of PPV (or NPV) across protected groups. This indicates that the task of post-processing a calibrated soft classifier to obtain a "fair" binary classifier with any fairness property is non-trivial. We then show that using different thresholds for the different groups, one can equalize either PPV or NPV (but not both) across the two groups, assuming the distribution ofŜ has some non-degeneracy property.
The combination of the impossibility of single threshold and the possibility of per-group threshold also stands in contrast to the belief that a soft classifier that is calibrated across both groups allows "ignoring" group-membership information in any post-processing decision [MP17] . Indeed, the conversion to a binary decision "loses information" in different ways for the two groups, and so group membership becomes relevant again after post-processing.
Results: Adding deferrals. For the second set of results we consider post-processing strategies that do not always output a decision. Rather, with some probability the output is ⊥, or "I dont know", which means that the decision is deferred to another (hopefully higher quality, even if more expensive) process. Let us first present our technical results and then discuss potential interpretations and context.
The first strategy is a natural extension of the per-group threshold: we use two thresholds per group, returning 1 above the right threshold, 0 below the left threshold, and ⊥ between the thresholds. We show that there always exists a way to choose the thresholds such that, conditioned on the decision not being ⊥, both the PPV and NPV are equal across groups.
Next we show a family of post-processing strategies where, conditioned on the decision not being ⊥, all four quantities (PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR) are equal across groups.
All strategies in this family have the following structure: Given an individual x, the strategy first makes a randomized decision whether to defer on x, where the probability depends onŜ(x) and the group membership of x. If not deferred, then the decision is made via another post-processing technique.
One method for determining the probabilities of deferrals is to make sure that, the distribution of scores returned by the calibrated soft classifier conditioned on not deferring, is equal for the two groups (That is, let p s,g denote the probability, restricted to group g, that an element gets score s conditioned on not deferring. Then for any s, we choose deferral probabilities so that p s,g 1 = p s,g 2 .) The resulting classifier can then be post-processed in any group-blind way (say, via a single threshold mechanism as described above).
Of course, the fact that all four quantities are equalized conditioned on not deferring does not, in and of itself, provide any guarantees regarding the fairness properties of the overall decision process -which includes also the downstream decision mechanism. For one, it would be naive to simply assume that fairness "composes" [DI18] . Furthermore, the impossibility of [Cho17, KMR16] says that the overall decision-making process cannot possibly equalize all four measures.
However, in some cases one can provide alternative (non-statistical) justification for the fairness of the overall process: For instance, if the downstream decision process never errs, the overall process might be considered "procedurally fair." We present more detailed reflections on our deferral-based approach in Section 4.
We note that deferring was considered in machine learning in a number of contexts, including the context of fairness-preservation [MPZ17] . In these works, the classifier typically punts only when its confidence regarding some decision is low. By contrast, we use deferrals in order to "equalize" the probability mass functions of the soft classifier over the two groups, which may involve deferring on individuals for whom there is higher confidence. Indeed, deferring on some higher-confidence individuals seems inherent to our goal of equalizing PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR while keeping the deferral rate low. Furthermore, our framework allows for a wide range of deferral strategies which might be used to promote additional goals. Pursuing alternate strategies for deferral is an interesting direction for future work.
Experimental results. We demonstrate the validity of our methodology on the Broward county dataset with COMPAS scores made public by ProPublica [ALMK16] . Indeed, it has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately calibrated soft classifier. We first ran our two-threshold post-processing mechanism and obtained a binary decision algorithm which equalizes both PPV and NPV across Caucasians and African-Americans.
We then ran our post-processing mechanism with deferrals to equalize all four of PPV, NPV, FPR, FNR across the two groups, with three different methods for deciding how to defer: In the first method, decisions are deferred only for Caucasians; in the second, decisions are deferred only for African Americans; in the third method, decisions are deferred for an equal fraction of Caucasians and of African Americans. This fraction is precisely equal to the statistical (total variation) distance between the distributions of scores produced by the soft classifier on the two groups. More details about the results along with figures are given in Section 6.
Extensions and open problems. As just mentioned, a natural question is to find alternative ways for deciding when to defer, along with ways to argue fairness properties for the overall combined process.
We also leave open the setting where individuals belong to multiple, potentially intersecting groups as in [HKRR17, KNRW18] .
Yet another question is to consider additional (or alternative) properties of soft classifiers that will make for more efficient or effective post-processing.
Related work
We briefly describe the works most closely related to ours, though both the list of works and their summaries are inevitably too short. Our work fits in a research program on group fairness notions following the work of Chouldechova [Cho17] and Kleinberg et al. [KMR16] . Those works demonstrate the inherent infeasibility of simultaneously equalizing a collection of measures of group accuracy. Our work considers the notions of calibration as formalized in [PRW + 17] and those of PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR from [Cho17] and [KMR16] .
The power of post-processing calibrated scores into decisions using threshold classifiers in the context of fairness has been previously studied by Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, and Huq [CPF + 17]. As in our work, they show that it is feasible to equalize certain statistical fairness notions across groups using (possibly different) thresholds. They additionally show that these thresholds are in some sense optimal. Whereas [CPF + 17] focuses on statistical parity, conditional statistical parity, and false positive rate, our most comparable results consider PPV. In our work, we further show that in some cases thresholds fail to equalize both PPV and NPV (called predictive parity by [Cho17] ), unless we also allow our post-processor to defer on some inputs. Our work also studies methods of post-processing that are much more powerful than thresholding, especially when allowing deferrals. On the technical side, [CPF + 17] assumes that their soft classifiers are supported on the continuous interval [0, 1], simplifying the analyses. We instead study classifiers with finite support as it is closer to true practice in many settings (e.g., COMPAS risk scores).
Using deferrals to promote fairness has been considered also in Zemel, Madras, and Pitassi [MPZ17] . Specifically they consider how deferring on some inputs may promote a combination of accuracy and fairness, especially when taking explicit account of the downstream decision maker. They make use of two-threshold deferring post-processors like those discussed in Section 5. While it helped inform our work, [MPZ17] takes a more experimental approach and focuses on minimizing the "disparate impact," a measure of total difference in classification error between groups, while maximizing accuracy. One important difference between our works is that Madras et al. distinguish between "rejecting" and "deferring." Rejecting is oblivious as to properties of the downstream decision maker, while deferring tries to counteract the biases of the decision maker. Our work considers only the former notion, but uses the term "defer" instead of "reject."
Preliminaries
We study the problem of binary classification. An instance is an element, usually denoted x, of a universe X . We restrict our attention to instances sampled uniformly at random from the universe, denoted X ∼ X . Our theory extends directly to any other distribution on X ; that distribution does not need to be known to the classifiers. Each instance x is associated with a true type Y (x) ∈ {0, 1}.
Each instance x is also associated with a group G(x) ∈ G, where G is the set of groups. We restrict our attention to sets G that form a partition of the universe X . We denote by X g the set of instances x in group g, and by X g the random variable distributed uniformly over X g . Note that for any events E 1 and E 2 ,
Definition 2.1 (Base rate (BR)). The base rate of a group g ∈ G, is
(1)
When X is finite, BR g is simply the fraction of individuals x in the group g for whom Y (x) = 1. A classifier is a randomized function with domain X × G. 1 A hard classifier, denotedŶ , outputs a prediction in {0, 1}, interpreted as a guess of the true type Y (x). A soft classifier, denotedŜ, outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1], interpreted as a measure of confidence that Y (x) = 1. We restrict our attention to soft classifiers with finite image. We call a classifier group blind if its output is independent of the input group g. For all groups g ∈ G, we call a hard classifierŶ non-trivial on g if Pr[Ŷ (X g ) = 1] > 0 and Pr[Ŷ (X g ) = 0] > 0. Hard classifiers are trivial on g if they are not non-trivial on g.
A post-processor is a randomized function with domain [0, 1] × G. As with classifiers, a postprocessor can be hard or soft. A hard post-processor, denotedD, outputs a prediction in {0, 1}. A soft post-processor, denotedD soft , outputs a score s ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that for a soft classifier S,D •Ŝ is a hard classifier, andD soft •Ŝ is a soft classifier. As with classifiers, we call a postprocessor group blind if its output is independent of the group g, and we restrict our attention to post-processors with finite image. The restriction to finite image is for mathematical convenience (and also because digital memory leads to discrete universes); our results generalize to infinite images as well.
In Section 4, we expand the definitions of both classifier and post-processors to allow an additional input or output: the special symbol ⊥.
Calibration
Several works concerning algorithmic fairness focus on various notions of calibration. The following calibration notions are defined only over soft classifiers:
Definition 2.2 (Calibration (Soft)). We say a soft classifierŜ is calibrated if ∀s ∈ [0, 1] for which Pr X∼X [Ŝ(X) = s] > 0,
The probability above is taken over the sampling of X, as well as random choices made byŜ at classification time.
1 As the focus of this paper is on the post processing of classifiers, we set aside questions such as the origin of the given classifier, including the randomness used in training, the origin or quality of the training data, and societal factors affecting the classifier. In particular, the classifiers we consider in this work are memoryless: they do not remember inputs or random choices from previous invocations. That is, we assume that if X, X are two independent random variables drawn from X thenŜ(X) andŜ(X ) (respectivelyŶ (X) andŶ (X )) are also independent random variables. (Alternatively, the present formalism can be viewed as fixing the random choices made during the training phase of the classifier, and taking probabilities only over the draws from X and over the random choices made by the classifier during the scoring phase.)
x ∈ X We call a classifier that returns results in [0, 1] a soft classifier to differentiate it from those which return results in {0, 1}, which we call hard classifiers. We refer to classifiers that take as input the output of a soft classifier as post-processors.
Definition 2.3 (Groupwise Calibration (Soft)). We say that a soft classifierŜ is groupwise calibrated if it is calibrated within all groups. That is, ∀g ∈ G and ∀s ∈ [0, 1] for which Pr[Ŝ(X g ) = s] > 0, we have that
Groupwise calibration is essentially the same notion as multicalibration [HKRR17] with the difference that in their case the true types are values in [0, 1]. We use a different term to emphasize that we restrict our attention to collections of groups G that form a partition of the universe X .
The two definitions above are stated for soft classifiers whose output distribution is discrete, since we must be able to condition on the eventŜ(X) = s orŜ(X g ) = s. That said, it extends naturally to classifiers with continuously-distributed outputs provided that the conditional probabilities are well defined.
Distributions on Calibrated Scores
Throughout this work, we make repeated reference to the probability mass function of the random variableŜ(X g ) for a calibrated soft classifierŜ acting on a randomly distributed input X g . We call this probability mass function the distribution on calibrated scores (DOCS).
Definition 2.4 (Distribution on Calibrated Scores (DOCS)). The distribution on calibrated scores (DOCS) of a calibrated soft classifierŜ for a group g, denoted byP g , is the PMF ofŜ(X g ). That is, for s ∈ [0, 1],P g (s) = Pr[Ŝ(X g ) = s].
Abusing notation, we denote byP the collection {P g } g∈G , and call it the DOCS ofŜ. We denote by Supp(P g ) the support of the DOCSP g , namely the set
A DOCS is a distribution of scores for a classifierŜ that happens to be calibrated. BecauseŜ is calibrated, the DOCS conveys information about the performance ofŜ, and is constrained by properties of the underlying distribution on X. For example, the DOCS' expectation is exactly the base rate for the population:
Proposition 2.1. For any groupwise calibrated soft classifierŜ, for all groups g ∈ G:
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
where the third line follows from the definition of a calibrated classifier (Definition 2.3).
DOCS also provide useful geometric intuition for reasoning about the effects of post-processing calibrated scores. We elaborate on this in Section 3.1 (see Figure 2 ).
Group Fairness Measures
Several well-studied measures of statistical "fairness" (e.g., [HPS16, Cho17, KMR16, PRW + 17, HKRR17, KNRW18]) look at how the following key performance measures of a classifier differ across groups. The false positive rate (FPR) of a hard classifierŶ for a group g is the rate at whicĥ Y gives a positive classification among instances x ∈ X g with true type 0. The false negative rate (FNR) is defined analogously for predicted negative instances with true type 1. Positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) track the rate of mistakes within instances that share a predicted type. Informally, positive predictive value captures how much meaning can be given to a predicted 1, and negative predictive value is similar for predicted 0. We now define these statistics formally.
Definition 2.5. Given a hard classifierŶ and a group g, we define the false positive rate ofŶ for g:
the false negative rate ofŶ for g:
the positive predictive value ofŶ for g:
the negative predictive value ofŶ for g:
The probability statements in the definitions above reflect two sources of randomness: the sampling of X g from the group g and any random choices made by the classifierŶ .
Among previous works, some [HPS16, KMR16] focus on equalizing only one or both of the false positive rates and false negative rates across groups, called balance for the negative and positive classes, respectively. Equalizing positive and negative predictive value across groups is often combined into one condition called predictive parity [Cho17] . We split the value out to be a separate condition for the positive and negative predictive classes. Predictive parity appears to be a hard-classifier analogue of calibration: both can be interpreted as saying that the output of the classifier (hard or soft) contains all the information contained in group membership. Our results highlight that the relationship between these notions is more subtle than it first appears; see Section 3 for further discussion.
The Limits of Post-Processing
Suppose throughout this section thatŜ is a groupwise calibrated soft classifier. Our goal in this section is to make binary predictions based onŜ(x) -and possibly the group G(x) -subject to equalizing PPV and/or NPV among groups. That is, we wish to make a prediction using a hard post-processorD such thatŶ =D •Ŝ equalizes PPV and/or NPV among groups. We chose to concentrate first on (the limitations of) equalizing PPV and NPV rather than FPR and FNR due to the conceptual similarity of PPV and NPV to calibration. Also, the case of equalizing false positive rates with thresholds is addressed in [CPF + 17].
Fairness Conditions for Post-Processors
We begin by making a simple observation about post-processing that provides some geometric intuition for the rest of this section. Just as in Proposition 2.1, we can express PPVŶ ,g and NPVŶ ,g succinctly in terms of conditional expectations over the DOCSP g .
Proposition 3.1. LetŶ =D •Ŝ be a hard classifier that is non-trivial for all g ∈ G whereŜ is groupwise calibrated with respect to G. For any g ∈ G we have:
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We first observe that the output of a post-processor is conditionally independent of the true type, conditioned on the output of the soft classifier it is post-processing and the group membership:
Fact 3.1. Consider any randomized functionD : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1}. SinceD is a randomized function with inputs s ∈ [0, 1] and g ∈ G, we have that
(2) or in other words thatD(Ŝ(X), G(X)) is conditionally independent of the true type Y (X), since fixing the inputs toD makes its output purely a function of its random string. Now recall that PPVŶ ,g and NPVŶ ,g are well-defined for all groups becauseŶ is non-trivial on all groups. We then have where the fourth line follows from the fact that the group g is fixed within X g , which lets us apply Fact 3.1, and the fact thatŜ is calibrated on g. Similar simplifications give us that
Using Proposition 3.1, we can geometrically see how certain post-processing decision rules will interact with the DOCS for a group g. For example, using a threshold, the expected true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives can be estimated, as shown in Figure 2 .
Proposition 3.2 below gives a characterizations of the false positive and false negative rates in a manner analogous to how Proposition 3.1 describes PPV and NPV:
Proposition 3.2. LetŶ andŜ be hard and soft classifiers as in Proposition 3.1. Then for any g ∈ G,
Assume that P r[Y (X g ) = 1] > 0 and P r[Y (X g ) = 0] > 0 (that is, assume 0 < BR g < 1) so that FPR and FNR are well-defined.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We give the proof for FPR, and the proof for FNR is similar. By applying Bayes' rule, we can write
Noting that Pr[Y (X g ) = 0 |Ŷ (X g ) = 1] = 1 − PPVŶ ,g , we can apply Proposition 3.1 and rearrange to write the RHS of Equation 3 as follows.
We note that Pr[Y (X g ) = 0] = 1 − E [Ŝ(X g )] (Proposition 2.1). Substituting this in to the RHS of Equation 4, we conclude the result.
General impossibility of equalizing PPV, NPV
It is not always possible to directly post-process a soft groupwise calibrated classifier into a hard one with equalized PPV (or NPV) for all groups, as we demonstrate by counterexample in Proposition 3.3. Before proceeding, we note that our counterexample is somewhat contrived-in particular, the DOCS induced by the soft classifierŜ in the proof of Proposition 3.3 takes only one value on each group. When DOCS ofŜ is more nicely structured on each group, we will see that there are general methods to equalize PPV (or NPV).
Proposition 3.3. Fix two disjoint groups g 1 and g 2 with respective base rates BR 1 and BR 2 such that BR 1 = BR 2 . Then there exists a soft classifierŜ that is groupwise calibrated, but for which there is no post-processorD : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1} such thatD •Ŝ equalizes PPV, unless Pr[D(BR i , g i ) = 1] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider the classifierŜ such thatŜ(x) = BR 1 if x ∈ g 1 andŜ(x) = BR 2 if x ∈ g 2 . This classifier is trivially groupwise calibrated. Since Pr[D(BR i , g i ) = 1] > 0 for i = 1 and 2, we conclude that PPVŶ ,g i is well-defined for g 1 and g 2 . The proof now follows from the characterization of PPV in Proposition 3.1. This is because PPVŶ ,g i is equal to the expectation of S(X) where X is drawn from a distribution with support contained in g i , and hence it is equal to BR i , and BR 1 = BR 2 .
The analogous statement regarding impossibility of equalizing NPV is formulated as Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1.
A niceness Condition for DOCS
We now give a non-degeneracy condition condition on DOCS motivated by the impossibility result for post-processing given by Proposition 3.3.
Definition 3.1 (Niceness of DOCS). Let G be a set of groups. A distribution on calibrated scoreŝ P is nice if Supp(P g ) is the same for all g ∈ G.
Note that this condition rules out the counterexample given by Proposition 3.3, since the DOCS in the counterexample had different (in fact, disjoint) supports for different groups. Hence, we can hope to successfully post-process soft classifiers with nice DOCS.
Equalizing PPV or NPV by Thresholding
We pay special attention to thresholds because they are simple to understand and therefore very widely used. We use one slight modification to deterministic thresholds that adds an element of randomness: if a score is at the threshold, we randomly determine which side of the threshold it falls on, according to a distribution defined below.
is a function from a score s ∈ [0, 1] and a group g ∈ G, parameterized by τ and R. The threshold parameter τ : G → [0, 1] specifies the threshold for the group g, and R : G → [0, 1] is the probability of returning 1 when the input score s is on the threshold τ (g). It returns the following outputs:
In the setting of an infinite number of scores and a continuous domain (i.e. scores are represented by a probability density function instead of a probability mass function), we can use purely deterministic threshold functions in which R ≡ 1, and achieve very similar results for the rest of this section.
If both τ (g) and R(g) do not vary across groups g ∈ G, then the post-processor is the same across groups. In this case, we will call the post-processor a group blind threshold post-processor, and will overload τ and R to be constants.
We now study the effectiveness of thresholds for post-processing soft classifiers with nice DOCS. The main takeaways are:
1. If the DOCS are nice, then threshold post-processors can equalize PPV (Propositions 3.4 and 3.6).
2. However, group blind threshold post-processors are rather limited in their ability to equalize PPV (Proposition 3.5).
3. Furthermore, equalizing PPV with thresholds (group blind or otherwise) may have undesirable social consequences.
4. Thresholds cannot always equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously, even for nice DOCS (Proposition 3.7).
Results 1-3 also apply to NPV (see Proposition A.3).
Group Blind Thresholds
We begin by classifying which group-blind threshold post-processors can equalize PPVs across all groups (Propositions 3.4 and 3.5). By symmetry, our arguments give a similar characterization for equalizing NPVs.
Proposition 3.4. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifierŜ and for every group-blind threshold post-processorD (τ,R) such that τ (g) = max(Supp(P g )) for all g, then the composed clas-sifierŶ =D (τ,R) •Ŝ equalizes PPVs across all groups for whichŶ is non-trivial.
The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.4 follows from the assumed finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range of the soft classifier is infinite, such post-processors may not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Any of the given post-processors only ever maps the largest score in the support ofP g to 1, for all groups g. Hence, PPV g is exactly the largest score in Supp(P g ). By the assumption thatP is nice, Supp(P g ) is the same for all groups g, and hence the PPV is equalized across groups.
We prove the analogous statement for NPV in Proposition A.2 in the Appendix. We proceed to show that the post-processors described in Proposition 3.4 are the only non-trivial, group blind post-processors that equalize PPV across groups in general, as we prove in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice DOCS for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones in Proposition 3.4, can equalize PPV across groups.
At a high level, the proof of Proposition 3.5 works as follows: We can make the DOCS on one group uniform, and the DOCS of another group strictly increasing. Then, threshold post-processors naturally favor the latter group, as the DOCS for that group gives more weight to higher scores than lower ones when compared to the former DOCS. Our characterization of PPV (Proposition 3.1) features prominently in the proof.
In preparation to proving Proposition 3.5, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Let g 1 , g 2 ∈ G be two different groups, and fix a group-blind threshold post-processor D (τ,R) . LetP g 1 ,(τ,R) be the expected conditional DOCS on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with the DOCSP g 1 over scores in group g 1 and conditioning on the scores thatD (τ,R) sends to 1, and similarly letP g 2 ,(τ,R) denote the same type of conditional DOCS when starting with theP g 2 over scores in group g 2 . IfP g 2 ,(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,(τ,R) , then
We use the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1, for the special case where the post-processor thresholds as described above. We can write the PPV for group g 1 as follows:
where the second line follows from the definition ofP g 1 ,(τ,R) . Similarly, we have that
SinceP g 2 ,(τ,R) stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,(τ,R) , the expectation on the RHS of Equation 6 is larger than the expectation on the RHS of Equation 5, yielding the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Fix two groups g 1 and g 2 and a finite set of points S ⊂ [0, 1] such that the PMFs of the soft classifierŜ on g 1 and g 2 have support equal to S -that is, Supp(P g 1 ) = Supp(P g 2 ) = S. For concreteness, suppose that |S| = 10.
Let the PMFs of the soft classifierŜ on these two groups respectively be given byP g 1 (s) = 1/|Supp(P g 1 )| andP g 2 (s) ∝ s for all s ∈ S, whereP g 2 is normalized with a constant such that it sums to 1. Fix a group blind threshold post-processorD (τ,R) that is not one of the ones mentioned in Proposition 3.4. SinceŜ (τ,R) is group blind, its threshold function is a constant which we name τ .
LetP g 1 ,(τ,R) be the expected conditional DOCS on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with the DOCSP g 1 over scores in group g 1 and conditioning on the scores thatD (τ,R) sends to 1. We can get this conditional PMF by removing scores s < τ , multiplyingP g 1 (τ ) by R, and re-normalizing the remaining values to get a distribution. LetP g 2 ,(τ,R) be defined similarly.
We claim thatP g 2 ,(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,(τ,R) , which allows us to invoke Lemma 3.1 to conclude that the PPV on the two groups are unequal. We now show thatP g 2 ,(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,(τ,R) . This is clearly true by design if R = 0 or 1: in this case, the post-processor is simply a deterministic threshold function, and we know by design that P g 1 ,(τ,R) is uniform whileP g 2 ,(τ,R) is a strictly increasing function. If R = r for some r ∈ (0, 1), then we can writeP g 1 ,(τ,R) as a convex combination ofP g 1 ,τ,0 andP g 1 ,τ,1 (with weight r on the distribution where R = 1, and weight 1 − r on the distribution where R = 0). We can writê P g 2 ,(τ,R) as the same convex combination of the conditional distributions over g 2 where R = 0 and R = 1. Since we already established stochastic domination for the cases where R = 0 and R = 1, this establishes stochastic domination for the case where R ∈ (0, 1). We achieve the same result for NPV in Proposition A.3. In the setting where the range of the soft classifier is infinite and continuous, we show in Proposition A.5 that a similar negative result holds, but without the existence of the classifiers in Proposition 3.4.
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the limitations of group blind thresholds on calibrated scores. Though this method of post-processing has social appeal, it does not actually preserve the fairness properties that one would expect. In the next section we repeat our analysis but relax our group blindness requirement.
Group-Aware Thresholds
If we allow the different groups to have different thresholds, then we grant ourselves more degrees of freedom to be able to satisfy binary fairness constraints. In particular, we can equalize PPV across groups in a more meaningful way than done in Proposition 3.4.
Recall that the group blind threshold post-processors in Proposition 3.4 are the only group blind threshold post-processors that work on certain nice DOCS (shown in Proposition 3.5). However, these post-processors have the property that the only score they map to 1 is the largest score in the support, which can be undesirable for many applications.
In particular, all classifiers in Proposition 3.5 make the PPV on each group g i equal to the maximum score in the support ofP g i . However, the (not-necessarily-group-blind) threshold postprocessors in Proposition 3.6 below can make the PPV on each group equal to any fixed value between the maximum base rate of g i and the maximum score in Supp(P g i ).
Proposition 3.6. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifierŜ with a nice DOCSP such that S is groupwise calibrated over G and |Supp(P g )| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G, then there exists a non group blind, non-trivial threshold post-processorD (τ,R) that is not one of the ones from Proposition 3.4 such that the hard classifierŶ =D (τ,R) •Ŝ equalizes PPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary value in (max i BR g i , s max ), where max i BR g i is the maximum base rate among the groups g i ∈ G and s max is the maximum score in the support ofP g i . 2 Moreover, since this post-processor is not group blind, it is not one of the post-processors described in Proposition 3.4.
In preparation to proving Proposition 3.6, we first prove the following claim:
Claim 3.1 (Monotonicity of PPV and NPV). Fix a soft classifierŜ and corresponding DOCSP, as well as a group g. Fix group blind threshold post-processorsD τ 1 ,R 1 andD τ 2 ,R 2 such that either τ 1 < τ 2 or τ 1 = τ 2 and R 1 ≥ R 2 . Then:
Proof. We show conclusion (a); conclusion (b) is shown analogously. DefineP g,τ 1 ,R 1 to be the conditional PMF on scores ≥ τ 1 that results from starting with the DOCSP g over scores in group g and conditioning on the scores thatD τ 1 ,R 1 sends to 1, and letP g,τ 2 ,R 2 be defined similarly (but for the threshold post-processorD τ 2 ,R 2 ). We claim thatP g,τ 2 ,R 2 stochastically dominatesP g,τ 1 ,R 1 , which yields the desired result by the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1 (and more explicitly written in Equations 5 and 6).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Fix a soft classifierŜ with a nice DOCSP that is group-wise calibrated over g 1 , . . . , g n , and fix a desired value v ∈ (max i BR g i , s max ). We will show that we can design a threshold post-processor (τ, R) such that PPV g,D (τ,R) •Ŝ = v for all groups g.
Fix an arbitrary group g j . We proceed via a continuity argument to show that we can tune the threshold on g j to achieve PPV equal to v. The maximum possible value for PPV g j ,D (τ,R) is s max (achieved when τ = s max , by Claim 3.1), where s max is the largest score in the support, as defined in the proposition statement 3 . Furthermore, note that, for any group, a lower bound on the PPV of a hard classifier on that group is the base rate of the group, where the lower bound is matched by the trivial post-processor that sends every score to 1. This follows from Claim 3.1.
We now claim that there is a setting of τ (g j ) and R(g j ) that achieves PPV g,D (τ,R) •Ŝ = v. We accomplish this by showing that there is a way to change (τ (g j ), R(g j )) such that the PPV decreases continuously. We first show:
Claim 3.2 (Continuity of PPV). Fix a soft classifierŜ and corresponding DOCSP, as well as a group g. Suppose we have two post-processing algorithms,D 1 andD 2 . LetP g,D 1 be the expected conditional DOCS that results from starting with the DOCSP g over scores in group g and conditioning on the scores thatD 1 sends to 1, and defineP g,D 2 similarly. If d T V (P g,D 1 ,P g,D 2 ) < , then |PPV g,D 1 •Ŝ − PPV g,D 2 •Ŝ | < O( ). Or in words, if the distance between the conditional DOCS is small, then the difference in PPV is small.
Proof. Recall the characterization of PPV given in Proposition 3.1 (and more explicitly written in Equation 5 ). This tells us that the PPV of group g for the classifierD 1 •Ŝ is exactly the expectation of a random variable distributed according toP g,D 1 . Similarly, the PPV of group g for the classifier D 2 •Ŝ is the expectation of a r.v. distributed according toP g,D 2 . Since bothP g,D 1 andP g,D 2 have support bounded between 0 and 1, their expectations can differ by at most , from which the claim follows. For completeness, we prove this below.
Suppose wlog thatP g,D 1 has the larger expectation. Let S = {s ∈ Supp(P g ) :P g,D 1 (s) > P g,D 2 (s)}. Then:
where in the second line we use the fact that PPV g,D 2 •Ŝ is the expectation ofP g,D 2 , and in the last line we use the fact that s ∈ [0, 1] and that the TV-distance between the two distributions is less than .
Now, consider the following way to change (τ (g j ), R(g j )). Fix > 0, and an initial setting for (τ (g j ), R(g j )) s.t. τ (g j ) is not the smallest item in the support or R(g j ) > . Reduce R(g j ) by , wrapping around on the interval (0, 1] and decreasing τ (g j ) to the next largest item in the support when this would otherwise make R(g j ) negative.
This very minor transformation to the threshold changes the DOCS conditional on outputting 1 very slightly -so slightly that the TV distance between the old conditional DOCS and the new DOCS is at most some which is a function of . This lets us apply Claim 3.2 to show that the PPV changes by at most a function of . So as we take going towards 0, this shows that the PPV changes by an amount going towards 0. This establishes that the PPV changes "continuously" with respect to this deforming procedure.
By Claim 3.1, we have that the above deforming procedure can only decrease the PPV. Therefore, we can continuously decrease the PPV, starting from s max , by continuously deforming the threshold post-processor with the method above. Note that s max > v > max i BR g i ≥ BR g j . By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must be a setting of (τ (g j ), R(g j )) such that PPV g j ,D (τ,R) •Ŝ = v.
We assert the analogous statement for the case of NPV in Claim A.1. The corresponding statement for the case of soft classifiers with infinite range is asserted in Proposition A.6.
The Limitations of Thresholding
While Proposition 3.6 shows that a threshold post-processor can equalize the PPV across n groups, this threshold post-processor can be unsatisfying from a social justice standpoint. Consider an example with two groups g 1 and g 2 , where group g 2 is "privileged" by having a higher base rate of, say, credit worthiness. Suppose that we have a DOCS that is decreasing with respect to score on group g 1 , and increasing with respect to score on group g 2 . This is illustrated in Example 3.1 Figure 3 : Accompanying Example 3.1, the PPV for both groups is 0.77. However, the threshold for g1 (dark blue) is higher than the threshold for g2 (orange), even though g2 is likely the more privileged group.
and Figure 3 . This means that a group blind threshold post-processor yields larger PPV on g 2 , since large scores are given more weight in g 2 . So, to equalize the PPV between the two groups, we will classify more low scores as positive in g 2 than g 1 . This effectively means that our threshold on group g 2 is more lenient than our threshold on g 1 , which seems blatantly unfair, since g 2 is the privileged group in the first place! Example 3.1 (Socially Unsatisfying Example). Fix groups g 1 and g 2 , and we fix the DOCS of the soft classifierŜ as follows. Let Supp(P g i ) be {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1) for i = 1 and 2, letP g 1 (s) ∝ a − s for appropriately selected constant a > 0 and letP g 2 (s) ∝ s. Group g 2 has a higher base rate and may have social advantages over group g 1 .
LetD (τ,R) be a non-trivial post-processor. IfD (τ,R) were group blind, then by Lemma 3.1, sincê P g 2 ,D (τ,R) stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,D (τ,R) , the PPV on g 2 must be larger than the PPV of g 1 . To equalize PPV, by Claim 3.1, we must have either τ (g 2 ) < τ (g 1 ), or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) < R(g 1 ). The disadvantaged group is now held to a higher standard than the privileged group to maintain equality of PPV. Figure 3 illustrates example thresholds that equalize the PPV.
Furthermore, thresholding cannot in general equalize both PPV and NPV simultaneously, even for nice DOCS and using non-group blind thresholds.
Proposition 3.7. Fix groups g 1 and g 2 . There exists a soft classifierŜ with a nice DOCSP such that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV and NPV between groups g 1 and g 2 .
Before proving the statement, we first show that the base rates of g 1 and g 2 can be written as convex combinations of the PPV and 1 − NPV on the respective groups:
Claim 3.3. Fix any group g ∈ G, and let the hard classifierŶ be non-trivial. Then the base rate of g can be written as a convex combination of PPV g,Ŷ and 1 − NPV g,Ŷ Proof.
A simple intuition for the proof of Proposition 3.7 is as follows. Suppose we have two groups, and the soft classifier is almost perfect on one group -for all but a small fraction of people, it gives the correct binary score, and gives the remaining people score 0.5. On the other group, it is the opposite -almost every person is given score 0.5, and there are only a few people given their ground truth score. The corresponding DOCS of each group have equal supports, and therefore are "nice." However, it is clear that any threshold post-processor on the first group will have extremely high PPV and NPV, while any threshold post-processor on the second group will have to make decision on where to round the people in the 0.5 bucket, and will correspondingly either have low PPV or NPV.
This example is somewhat unsatisfying, as the DOCS satisfies niceness by a technicality (for example, it is extremely close to a DOCS with disjoint supports between groups). The proof generalizes the above example to a case where scores for one group are slightly more "correlated" with the ground truth labels than scores for the other group. Appendix A.2 shows the corresponding result when the range of the soft classifier is infinite.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Let Supp(P g i ) be {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} for i = 1 and 2. LetP g 1 be uniform over scores, and letP g 2 (s) = −a(s − 1/2) 2 + b for some appropriately chosen constants a, b ≥ 0 such thatP g 2 is a valid probability distribution.
We claim that there is no threshold post-processor that can equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously for these two groups. First, note that the base rates for the two groups are equal to 1/2 by design, due to the symmetric nature of the DOCS on each group. Just like in the proof of Proposition 3.5, we use the notationP g 1 ,≥(τ,R) to denote the conditional DOCS supported on scores ≥ τ that results from starting with the DOCSP g 1 over all scores in group g 1 and conditioning on the scores thatD (τ,R) sends to 1, and defineP g 2 ,≥(τ,R) similarly. LetP g i ,≤(τ,R) denote the conditional DOCS starting from group g i and conditioning on the scores thatD (τ,R) sends to 0.
We proceed by a case analysis on the location of the threshold for group g 1 -that is, on τ (g 1 ).
Case 1: τ (g 1 ) ≥ 1/2. First, suppose additionally thatD (τ,R) is group blind over g 1 , g 2 , then P g 2 ,(τ,R) is strictly stochastically dominated byP g 1 ,(τ,R) so the PPV is lower on g 2 than g 1 (Lemma 3.1). Therefore, to equalize the PPV between the two groups, the threshold on group g 2 must be to the "right" of the threshold on g 1 (that is, either τ (g 2 ) > τ (g 1 ) or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) < R(g 1 )), which follows from Claim 3.1. However, we claim that this setting of thresholds makes the NPV on group g 2 lower than the NPV on group g 1 . It suffices to show that, for any constant threshold post-processor classifierD (τ,R) with τ (g 1 ) = τ (g 2 ) ≥ 1/2, the NPV on group g 2 is lower than the NPV on group g 1 . This implies that the same statement holds when either τ (g 2 ) > τ (g 1 ) or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) < R(g 1 ) as well, due to the monotonicity property of NPV (Claim 3.1). This suffices to prove Proposition 3.7 for the case when τ (g 1 ) ≥ 1/2: we need to set τ (g 2 ), R(g 2 ) such that either τ (g 2 ) > τ (g 1 ) or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) < R(g 1 ) in order to equalize PPV, but this leaves the NPV on group g 2 lower than the NPV on group g 1 . Now we proceed to show that the NPV is lower on g 2 when the threshold post-processor is constant. Fix a constant threshold post-processorD (τ,R) with τ ≥ 1/2. We have already established that this means that PPV g 2 ,D (τ,R) •Ŝ < PPV g 1 ,D (τ,R) •Ŝ . Now, since the base rates of g 1 and g 2 are equal, this implies that
Rearranging, this shows that NPV g 2 ,D (τ,R) •Ŝ < NPV g 1 ,D (τ,R) •Ŝ , finishing the proof of this case.
Case 2: τ (g 1 ) < 1/2. The argument in this case is symmetrical to the previous case, where we switch the roles of PPV and NPV in the argument. We sketch it for the sake of completeness. Fix a constant threshold post-processor such that τ (g 1 ) = τ (g 2 ) < 1/2. By design,P g 2 ,≤(τ,R) strictly stochastically dominatesP g 1 ,≤(τ,R) . Hence, the NPV on group g 2 is smaller than the NPV on group g 1 (this follows from an analogous version of Lemma 3.1 for NPV instead of PPV). This means that the threshold post-processor cannot be constant to equalize NPVs -it must be moved such that either τ (g 2 ) < τ (g 1 ) or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) > R(g 1 ) (Claim 3.1).
However, by the same convex combination argument as in the previous case, we get that any such constant threshold post-processor must make the PPV on g 2 strictly smaller than the PPV on g 1 . By the monotonicity of PPV, this means that any threshold post-processor with either τ (g 2 ) < τ (g 1 ) or τ (g 2 ) = τ (g 1 ) and R(g 2 ) > R(g 1 ) must also make the PPV on g 2 smaller than the PPV on g 1 , finishing the proof.
Equalizing DOCS
While thresholding is a conceptually simple approach to post-processing a soft classifier, its power is limited. We now consider a very different approach using soft post-processors to equalize the DOCS across groups of a soft classifier. The intuition is that if the DOCS are equal across groups, then any hard post-processor that is group blind should result in equal PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR. We formalize this intuition in Claim 3.4.
LetŜ be a soft classifier and for each group g ∈ G, letP g be the DOCS ofŜ for group g. For a soft post-processorD soft , letŜ =D soft •Ŝ and letP g be the corresponding DOCS for group g.
Our goal is to find a soft post-processorD soft such thatŜ is groupwise calibrated, andP g =P g for all g, g ∈ G. In this section, we describe only one approach to constructingD soft which we call mass averaging.
The approach of equalizing DOCS has a fundamental weakness: ifP g =P g and both are calibrated, then BR g = BR g . This severely limits applicability of this approach. However, this limitation will removed in Section 5.2 by allowing deferrals.
Claim 3.4. If the DOCS are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR are equalized by any hard post-processorD satisfying group blindness.
The group-blindness requirement in the claim is necessary: consider the (not group blind) post-processor that outputs 0 on one group and 1 on the other; PPV will not be equalized.
Proof of Claim: 3.4. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining properties may be proved similarly. LetŶ =D •Ŝ be a hard classifierŶ that is a group blind post-processorD composed with a calibrated soft classifierŜ. All probabilities below are over X g ∼ X g , and the coins ofŜ and D.
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely, Pr[Y (X g ) = 1] is equalized by calibration and equalized DOCS; Pr[Ŷ (X g , g) = 1] by group blindness and equalized DOCS; Pr[Ŷ (X g , g) = 1 |Ŝ(X g ) = s, Y (X g ) = 1] by group blindness; Pr[Y (X g ) = 1 |Ŝ(X g ) = s] by calibration; and finally Pr[Ŝ(X g ) = s] by equalized DOCS.
Mass Averaging
The mass-averaging technique is best illustrated with an example. Suppose thatP g 1 is uniform over {0, 0.5, 1}, andP g 2 is uniform over {0, 1}. It is easy to define a soft post-processorD soft which equalizes these two DOCS. On g 1 , we leave the score unchanged:D soft (s, g 1 ) = s. On g 2 , we compute the output asD soft (s, g 2 ) = s w.p. 2/3 0.5 w.p. 1/3 .
The DOCS for groups g 1 and g 2 of the resulting soft classifierŜ =D soft •Ŝ are equal, and are equal toP g 1 . In the example, the probability mass is being redistributed by averaging the scores. This can be equivalently viewed as adding noise to the scores and then recalibrating the scores, something discussed in [CPF + 17].
More generally, a mass-averaging post processorD soft assigns to each possible pair (s, g) a distribution over possible output scores s . Such aD soft is fully specified by k · k · |G| parameters, where k is the number of possible values of s and k is the number of possible values of s . Given a soft classifierŜ and a mass-averaging post processorD soft , the constraint that the resulting DOCS are equalized across groups is linear in these parameters. Such classifiers, therefore, may be found by a linear program. We do not explore the choice of mass-averaging post-processors further.
Deferral Preliminaries
In the first part of the paper, we considered the problem of post-processing calibrated soft classifiers, which output a score s ∈ [0, 1], into fair hard classifiers, which output a decision inŷ ∈ {0, 1}, subject to a number of group fairness conditions. In the remainder of this work, we reconsider this problem, but with one important change: we allow classifiers to "refuse to decide" by outputting the special symbol ⊥. We call such classifiers deferring classifiers, borrowing the nomenclature from [MPZ17] . The output ⊥ is the deferring classifier's way of refusing to make a decision and deferring to a downstream decision maker. For example, a risk assessment tool might aid a parole board to make a decision by categorizing an individual as high risk or low risk, or it might output ⊥-providing no advice and deferring to the judgment of the board. We now modify our notation appropriately. Instances x are still associated with a true type Y (x) ∈ {0, 1} and a group G(x) ∈ G. A deferring hard classifierŶ is a randomized function Y : X → {0, 1, ⊥}. A deferring soft classifier is a randomized functionŜ : X → [0, 1] ∪ {⊥}. A deferring hard (resp. soft) post-processor is a randomized functionD : [0, 1] ∪ {⊥} × G → {0, 1, ⊥} (resp.D soft : [0, 1] ∪ {⊥} × G → [0, 1] ∪ {⊥}) that takes as input the output of a deferring soft and post-processes it into a deferring hard (resp. soft) classifier.
Types of downstream decision makers
It's important to recognize that deferring does not fix unfairness, it only transforms it. Ultimately, whether a deferring classifier is thought of as promoting fairness may depend on the nature of the downstream decision maker who must make decisions on instances which have been deferred.
One convenient yet often unrealistic scenario is a "perfect" downstream decision maker: some procedure that is expensive to run but offers perfect (or near-perfect) accuracy. A perfectly accurate downstream decision maker is "fair" in a number of ways: it offers perfect PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR to all groups;furthermore, it is also individually fair-treating likes alike. The unfairness that remains in the overall system, therefore, is a function of the distribution of deferrals.
A somewhat more realistic scenario is a "perfect-but-painful" downstream decision maker. This differs from the above in that it is costly not only to the entity making the decision, but also to the individual being decided upon. For example, an individual might receive accurate medical diagnoses only after being subjected to very invasive or harmful tests. The expense of deferral to the individual complicates our understanding of the fairness of the overall system.
Another likely scenario is that ⊥ results are passed to a different, potentially human decisionmaker, which may not be as accurate as the original classifier (though is potentially inaccurate in an incomparable way). As in the earlier scenarios, unfairness may manifest itself in the decision to defer. However, there may be even greater unfairness to the deferred individuals.
In either scenario, we may wish to minimize the total rate of deferrals, equalize it between groups, or restrict deferrals to a particular group.
Statistical properties of deferring classifiers: contrasting approaches
We wish to define statistical properties of deferring classifiers. While calibration, PPV, and NPV apply to deferring classifiers without change, it is not clear how best to generalize the definitions of FPR and FNR, or more generally the error rate.
For example, recall the definition of the false positive rate (Definition 2.5): The false positive rate of a (non-deferring) hard classifierŶ for a group g is FPRŶ ,g = Pr[Ŷ (X g ) = 1 | Y (X g ) = 0].
One possible approach to incorporating deferrals is to condition on not deferring. That is, define the conditional false positive rate as Pr[Ŷ (X g ) = 1 | Y (X g ) = 0,Ŷ (X g ) = ⊥]. A deferring classifier Y that output 1 on half of true negative instances (within a g) would have conditional false positive rate as low as 0.5 (if it never output ⊥ on true negatives) or as high as 1 (if it never output 0 on true negatives). The conditional false positive rate is agnostic towards the downstream decision maker. It codifies no value judgments as to whether a deferral is desirable or undesirable as an individual nor whether deferrals ultimately result in accurate or inaccurate decisions.
A second approach is to leave the original definition unchanged. The same deferring hard classifier as above would have (ordinary, not conditional) false positive rate Pr[Ŷ (X g ) = 1 | Y (X g ) = 0] = 0.5. This would be true regardless of whetherŶ output 0 or ⊥ on the other half of true negative instances. We call this the unconditional false positive rate. The unconditional false positive rate effectively categorizes deferrals as correct outputs. This may be appropriate if the downstream decision maker has very high accuracy. If, for example, a doctor orders an additional, more accurate diagnostic test in response to a deferral, the unconditional false positive rate might be appropriate.
Finally, a third approach is to base our measure of inaccuracy on the true negatives instead of the false positives. Namely, we could consider 1 − Pr X∼Xg [Ŷ (X) = 0 | Y (X) = 0]. In contrast to the unconditional false positive rate, this measure effectively categorizes deferrals as incorrect outputs. This may be appropriate if the downstream decision maker has is inaccurate, or if a deferral is associated with significant cost to the individual. Continuing the medical example, if the additional test requires an expensive and risky surgery, this third approach might be most appropriate.
Just as in the case of non-deferring classifiers, the relationships among these contrasting group statistics, their meaningfulness in different settings, and their application in different settings are not well understood and deserve further study.
In this work, we focus on the conditional versions of false positive and negative rates.
Definition 4.1. The conditional false positive rate and conditional false negative rate of a deferring hard classifierŶ for a group g are, respectively:
We additionally consider a version of the distribution of calibrated scores conditioned on not deferring, which we call the conditional DOCS. For non-deferring soft classifiers, Definitions 4.2 and 2.4 coincide.
Definition 4.2. The conditional DOCSP g of a classifierŜ for a group g is the PMF ofŜ(X g ), conditioned on not outputting ⊥. That is, for s ∈ [0, 1],P g (s) = Pr[Ŝ(X g ) = s |Ŝ(X g ) = ⊥]. Note that the conditional DOCS is undefined if Pr[Ŝ(X g ) = ⊥] = 0.
Abusing notation, we denote byP the collection {P g } g∈G , and call it the conditional DOCS ofŜ.
Because they make no assumptions about the behavior of the downstream decision maker, the conditional error rates are applicable generally, but they can be difficult to interpret. They are also amenable to the consideration of additional goals which we will briefly address. For example, one could seek to minimize the total deferral rate, equalize the deferral rate among groups, or prefer deferrals on positive instances.
Post-Processing Calibrated Classifiers with Deferrals
We return now to the problem of post-processing of calibrated soft classifiers, but now with the extra power of deferring on some inputs. We revisit the two approaches discussed in Section 3: thresholding and equalizing DOCS.
Thresholding with deferrals
Proposition 3.3 stated PPV and NPV cannot both be equalized across groups in general when using only a single threshold per group. By using two thresholds per groups and deferring on some inputs, PPV and NPV can always be equalized across groups.
We post-process using two thresholds per group as follows: return 0 when s is lower than the first threshold, return ⊥ between the thresholds, and return 1 above the second threshold, as shown in Figure 4 . This buys us more degrees of freedom when equalizing binary constraints, and it has the useful property that we say ⊥ on the instances where we are the least confident about the predicted type.
We adapt our notation as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Deferring Threshold Post-Processor). A deferring threshold post-processorD (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) assigns to each group g two thresholds τ 0 (g), τ 1 (g) ∈ Supp(P g ), and two probabilities R 0 (g), R 1 (g) ∈ [0, 1], with the following requirements:
1. for all g ∈ G, τ 0 (g) ≤ τ 1 (g) 2. for all g ∈ G for which τ 0 (g) = τ 1 (g), R 1 (g) + R 0 (g) ≤ 1. This corresponds to the case where the two thresholds are the same, and therefore individuals with that score must be mapped to 1 with probability R 1 (g), and to 0 with probability R 0 (g), with the remainder mapped to ⊥.
The corresponding threshold post-processor is defined as follows:
Using two thresholds allows the equalization of both PPV and NPV across groups in general, whereas without deferrals we could only equalize one or the other. We first demonstrate the existence of post-processors that are fairly limited, analogously to those defined in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 5.1. LetŜ be a soft classifier with nice DOCS for a set of groups G. Then every threshold post-processorD (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) satisfying the following properties equalizes both the PPV and NPV for all groups in G of the composed classifierŶ =D (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) •Ŝ: 2. R 0 (g) > 0 for all g.
3. τ 1 (g) = max(Supp(P g )) for all g 4. R 1 (g) > 0 for all g.
Notice that these classifiers cannot be trivial, because we defined R 0 and R 1 in a way that prohibits the possibility that the composed classifier never returns 0 or 1. For the cases where the range of soft classifier outputs is infinite and there is no max or min element, these classifiers do not exist.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The reasoning is similar to the non-deferral case for equality of PPV alone. The thresholds only allow one score s to map to 0 and one score to map to 1. Thus, PPV for both groups is equal to the largest score in the support and NPV for both groups is equal to 1 minus the smallest score in the support. Now, much like in Proposition 3.6, which showed the existence of meaningful non-trivial threshold post-processors that equalized PPV across groups, we show the existence of meaningful, nontrivial deferring threshold post-processors that equalize PPV and NPV across groups.
Proposition 5.2. LetŜ be a soft classifier with nice DOCS that is groupwise calibrated for a set of groups G. Suppose that |Supp(P g )| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G. Then there exists a non-trivial threshold post-processorD (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) that is not one of those defined in Proposition 5.1, such that the hard classifierŶ =D (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) •Ŝ equalizes PPV g and NPV g for all g ∈ G.
The main idea of the proof of this proposition is to use Proposition 3.6 twice: once for getting thresholds to equalize the PPV, and once for thresholds to equalize the NPV. These thresholds may be invalid because there may be a group g for which τ 0 (g) > τ 1 (g). We use Claims 3.1 and 3.2 to allow ourselves to push the PPV thresholds toward 1 and the NPV thresholds toward 0 until they no longer overlap, while still maintaining equalization of PPV and NPV for the other groups.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Recall by Claim 3.1 that the PPV ofŜ on a group g monotonically increases as τ 1 (g) increases and, if τ 1 (g) is constant, as R 1 (g) increases. By Claim 3.1, NPV monotonically increases as τ 0 (g) decreases, and, if τ 0 (g) is constant, as R 0 (g) increases. Recall by Claim 3.2 that if the total variance distance between conditional DOCS (conditioned on being post-processed to a result of 1) for different groups is at most , then the PPV difference for these groups is bounded by O( ). Thus, PPV g is continuous and monotonically increasing with regard to (τ 1 (g), R 1 (g)). Similarly, NPV g is continuous and monotonically increasing with (−τ 0 (g), R 0 (g)).
We know by Proposition 3.6 that there exists a non-group blind threshold rule (without deferrals) that equalizes the PPV among the groups. By the analogous Proposition A.4, there exists a (different) non-group-blind threshold rule that equalizes the NPV among the groups. For both of these, we know that they are not the classifiers from Proposition 5.1.
If the thresholds meet the conditions of being a deferring post-processor listed in Definition 5.1, then the statement is proven. If they do not meet the conditions because the thresholds "overlap," we repeat the following procedure until the conditions are met:
1. Let g be a group for which the conditions are not met, i.e. either τ 0 (g) > τ 1 (g), or τ 0 (g) = τ 1 (g) and R 0 (g) + R 1 (g) > 1.
2. If τ 0 (g) > τ 1 (g), define t = τ 0 (g)+τ 1 (g)
2
. Let t = arg min s∈Supp(Pg) |s − t |. Notice that t ≤ τ 0 (g) and t ≥ τ 1 (g), but because by assumption τ 0 (g) > τ 1 (g), t cannot be equal to both thresholds. Set the new value for both thresholds to t: τ 0 (g) = τ 1 (g) = t(g).
3. If R 0 (g) + R(g) > 1, then do the following:
(a) If τ 0 (g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then keep R 0 (g) the same, and set R 1 (g) = 1 − R 0 (g).
(b) If τ 1 (g) remained unaltered in the previous step, then set R 1 (g) the same and set R 0 (g) = 1 − R 1 (g).
(c) If neither of these is true, then let r = R 0 (g) R 0 (g)+R 1 (g) . Set R 0 (g) = r and R 1 (g) = 1 − r.
4. These thresholds are no longer overlapping, but they altered PPV g and NPV g . Notice that, by the monotonicity properties described above, the threshold rules were changed in ways that can only increase PPV g or NPV g :
(a) τ 1 (g) has increased or remained constant (b) if τ 1 (g) remained constant, then R 1 (g) also remained constant (c) τ 0 (g) has decreased or remained constant (d) if τ 0 (g) remained constant, then R 0 (g) remained constant
The new PPV and NPV for g may now be higher than those of the other groups.
5. For all other groups g = g, by the Intermediate Value Theorem and the continuity of NPV, there exists some (τ 0 (g ), R(g )) that sets NPV g = NPV g , and by the monotonicity of NPV, this threshold is lower than the old one. Similarly, there exists some (τ 1 (g ), R(g )) that sets PPV g = PPV g and it is higher than the old one. By the monotonicity of PPV and NPV, we know that this process will not cause non-overlapping thresholds to become overlapping.
The ultimate effect of these steps was to reduce the number of overlapping thresholds by at least one. We can repeat this process up to 2|G| times until none of the thresholds overlap.
Notice that this classifier is not one of the ones from Proposition 5.1 -if we did not have to correct for "overlapping," then this is true by assumption, and if we did do the correction process, then τ 0 (g) = τ 1 (g) for at least one g, and by assumption we had |Supp(P)| ≥ 2.
Thus, we have created valid a post-processorD (τ 0 ,τ 1 ,R 0 ,R 1 ) that equalizes PPV and NPV for all groups simultaneously and is not one of the ones in Proposition 5.1, proving the claim.
The following example demonstrates that it is sometimes possible to equalize PPV, NPV, FPR, and FNR using deferrals, but without equalizing the DOCS themselves:
Example 5.1 (Equalizing PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR with Thresholds). This example is presented with continuous support [0, 1] for simplicity. Consider two DOCS, one for group g 1 and one for g 2 . Let the DOCS for g 1 be uniform (with density give by the lineP(s) = 1), and let the DOCS for group g 2 have density given by the parabolaP(s) = 6s(1 − s), as shown in Figure 5 .
Consider the post-processorD soft (τ 0 ,τ 1 ) . 4 Let τ 0 (g 1 ) = τ 0 (g 1 ) = 0.5, let τ 0 (g 2 ) = 1 6 (5 − √ 7) and let τ 1 (g 2 ) = 1 − 1 6 (5 − √ 7) as shown in Figure 5 . The PPV and NPV of both groups is 3 4 , and the cFPR and cFNR of both is 1 4 , thus equalizing all four values.
This example is somewhat unsatisfactory because the base rates are equal in the two groups. We did not find a similar example without equal base rates. 
Equalizing DOCS with deferrals
As with Claim 3.4, equalizing the conditional DOCS between groups renders trivial the task of downstream decision-making subject to equality of PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR. Importantly, unlike in Section 3.5, equalizing the conditional DOCS between groups does not require the groups to have equal base rates, greatly increasing the applicability of this approach.
Claim 5.1. If the conditional DOCS are equal for two groups, then PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR are equalized (or simultaneously undefined) by any hard deferring post-processorD satisfying (1) group blindness and (2)D(⊥, g) = ⊥ (∀g).
The additional condition-thatD defers on input ⊥-is necessary: ifD output 1 on all inputs (even on ⊥), then PPV would remain unequal as long as the base rates differed. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 3.4.
Proof of Claim 5.1. We prove only that PPV is equalized; the remaining properties may be proved similarly. LetŶ =D •Ŝ. All probabilities below are over X g ∼ X g , and the coins ofŜ andD.
Each factor in this product is equal across groups by the assumptions. Namely IfŜ is a calibrated classifier, the soft deferring classifierŜ :=D soft Q •Ŝ is still calibrated. For a group g, letP g be the DOCS ofŜ andP g be the DOCS ofŜ . There is a simple graphical intuition for the shape ofP g , as shown in Figure 6 . More formally,
where ∆ := Pr[Ŝ (X g ) = ⊥ |Ŝ(X g ) = ⊥] = s∈Supp(Pg)P g (s)Q(s, g).
By appropriate choice of Q, any conditional DOCS can be transformed into almost any other conditional DOCS. Together, Theorem 5.1 and Claim 5.1 suggest a general framework for using deferrals to postprocess a soft, possibly deferring classifierŜ which is groupwise calibrated into a hard deferring classifier which simultaneously equalizes PPV, NPV, cFPR, and cFNR across groups, as follows.
For each g ∈ G, letP g be the conditional DOCS ofŜ for group g. LetP * be any conditional DOCS such that Supp(P * ) ⊆ ∩ g∈G Supp(P g ). Use Theorem 5.1 to equalize the conditional DOCS for all groups g ∈ G. Then use any hard post-processorD satisfying the requirements of Claim 5.1 to make the ultimate deferring hard classifier. This method is shown in Figure 6 .
This framework allows for enormous flexibility in the choice of bothP * andD, even when considering just two groups g 1 and g 2 . In Figure 10 , we illustrate the first step of the framework on a COMPAS dataset using min{P g 1 ,P g 2 } asP * , where g 1 is African-Americans and g 2 is Caucasians. In Figures 8 and 9 in Section 6, we also useP g 1 andP g 2 asP * . One can designP * to achieve additional goals. For example, the choiceP * = min{P g 1 ,P g 2 } results in equal deferral rate across each group (equal to the total variation distance between the two initial conditional DOCS). The framework can be further expanded by combining deferrals with other methods for manipulating conditional DOCS, including the mass-averaging discussed in Section 3.5. A better understanding of these techniques is left for future work.
Experiments on COMPAS Data
We demonstrate the validity of our methodology on the Broward County data made publicly available by ProPublica [ALMK16] . This data set contains the recidivism risk decile scores given by the COMPAS tool, 2-year recidivism outcomes, and a number of demographic and crime-related variables on individuals who were scored in 2013 and 2014. We restrict our attention to the subset of defendants whose race is recorded as African-American or Caucasian. These will form the two groups with respect to which we wish to examine different fairness criteria. After applying the same data pre-processing and filtering as reported in the ProPublica analysis, we are left with a data set on n = 5278 individuals, of whom 3175 are African-American and 2103 are Caucasian.
Indeed, it has been shown that the COMPAS scoring mechanism is an approximately calibrated soft classifier with 10 possible outcomes. We note here that the distribution of the COMPAS scores differs significantly across the two groups. In particular, the scores for Caucasians are more evenly distributed as opposed to the skewed distribution seen with African-Americans.
Thresholding with Deferrals
We first ran our two-threshold post-processing mechanism (Section 5.1) and obtained a binary decision algorithm with deferrals which equalizes both PPV and NPV across Caucasians and African-Americans (See Figure 7) . For simplicity we avoid using randomization for members within a particular decile score and instead settle for approximate equalization of PPV and NPV. We observe that the percent of deferrals in total is smaller than 20% of the decisions to be made which shows that a fairly large number of the defendants can be classified without having to defer to a downstream decision maker.
Next we look at our post-processing mechanisms to equalize all four quantities PPV, NPR, FPR, and NPR using deferrals (Section 5.2). As was noted earlier in the paper, equalizing the DOCS of the two groups post-deferral achieves the goal of equalizing all four of the above quantities. We implement two methods for doing so.
Converting one DOCS into Another
In the first method, decisions are deferred only on one group so as to convert its DOCS into that of the other group. First, we consider deferring only on Caucasians to convert their DOCS into that of African-Americans ( Figure 9 ); next, decisions are deferred only for African Americans (Figure 8 ).
Equalizing DOCS
Alternately we have a second method where decisions are deferred for an equal fraction of Caucasians and of African Americans (Figure 10 ). This fraction is precisely equal to the statistical (total variation) distance between the distributions of scores produced by the soft classifier on the two groups. Figure 10 : A version of our conditional DOCS equalization method applied to COMPAS data from 2016. The DOCS for African Americans and the DOCS for Caucasians are converted into a conditional DOCS that has the same distribution as the pointwise minimum of the two DOCS. Notice that the total deferral rate is equalized between the two groups (this is equal to precisely the total variation distance between the two DOCS), but the distribution of deferrals across scores is not.
We observe several striking phenomena on the COMPAS data set. First, using the method of deferring only on African-Americans we defer on roughly 36% of the total decisions. This number goes down to roughly 25% when we defer only on Caucasians. This seems to suggest as a general heuristic to try and use deferrals on the group with smaller size. The total deferral fraction is also roughly 25% when we defer on an equal fraction of Caucasians and African-Americans.
Second, for all three methods that equalize the score distributions, deferrals happen more on the "extremes", namely on individuals with respect to which the classifier had relatively high confidence (either close to 0 or close to 1). This stands in sharp contrast to how the two-threshold method (Figure 7 ) distributes its deferrals-they occur only in the middle of the distribution (namely for elements for which the classifier is "unsure").
While it may seem somewhat counter-productive at first to defer on these individuals, we note that any method that seeks to first equalize the distributions of calibrated scores will have to defer most on the scores which appear in different probabilities across he two groups (which, for the COMPAS predictor, is at the extremes). Furthermore, deferring on such scores may make sense from a social point of view: When a score appears at drastically different rates for different groups, perhaps deferring to another decision mechanism can be used to check for systemic bias in the present one.
A Results for NPV and Continuous, Full Support DOCS A.1 Results for Negative Predictive Value (NPV)
In Section 3, we proved limitations on the ability of post-processors to equalize PPV given a distribution on calibrated scores with finite support. For completeness, in this section, we give the statements of the analogous limitations for equalizing NPV and for continuous probability density functions with full support [0, 1].
We start with the analogous statement of Proposition 3.3 for NPV instead of PPV.
Proposition A.1. Fix two disjoint groups g 1 and g 2 with respective base rates BR 1 and BR 2 such that BR 1 = BR 2 . Then there exists a soft-valued classifierŜ that is groupwise calibrated, but for which there is no post-processorD : [0, 1] × G → {0, 1} such thatD •Ŝ equalizes NPV, unless Pr[D(BR i , g i ) = 0] = 0 for i = 1 or 2.
The nontriviality condition ensures that the NPV is well-defined on both groups (which can be compared to the nontriviality condition in Proposition 3.3, which ensures that the PPV is welldefined on both groups). The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 3.3: the fraction of predicted 0's in group g i that are true 0's is 1 − BR i , as the post-processor has no other information by which to make its decision, and hence the NPVs are unequal due to the differing base rates.
We now proceed to give the NPV analogs of our results on threshold post-processors in Section 3. We start with the analogous statement for Proposition 3.4 -that there is a class of simple groupblind threshold post-processors that equalizes the NPV across groups.
Proposition A.2. For every nice groupwise calibrated soft classifierŜ and for every group-blind threshold post-processorD (τ,R) such that τ (g) = min(Supp(P g )) and R(g) < 1 for all g, the composed classiferD •Ŝ equalizes NPVs across all groups.
The existence of the threshold post-processors in Proposition A.2 follows from the assumed finiteness of the range of the soft classifier. In the case where the range of the soft classifier is infinite, such post-processors may not exist (as there may be no minimum element of the support). The proof is once again analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.4: these classifiers only ever output 0 on the minimum element of the support ofP g , and hence the NPV is simply 1 minus the smallest element of the support for each group.
However, much like the case for PPV, other group-blind threshold post-processors cannot possibly equalize NPV. Proposition A.3. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a nice DOCS for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor, other than the ones in Proposition 3.4, can equalize NPV across groups.
The example of the groupwise-calibrated soft classifier is the exact same one that shows the statement for PPV. Indeed, we can see this in the following way. We can make the example in the proof of Proposition A.3 have equal base rates across groups, in which case it follows from Proposition 3.5 due to Claim 3.3.
When we turn to threshold post-processors that are not group-blind, we again get analogous results for NPV. Proposition A.4. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifierŜ with a nice DOCSP such thatŜ is groupwise-calibrated over G and |Supp(P g )| ≥ 2 for all g ∈ G, there exists a ( non-groupblind), non-trivial threshold post-processorD (τ,R) that is not one of the group blind post-processors in Proposition 3.4, such that the hard classifierŶ =D (τ,R) •Ŝ equalizes NPV across G.
This holds even if we require that the NPV of all the groups is an arbitrary value in (s min , min i BR g i ), where min i BR g i is the minimum base rate among the groups and s min is the minimum score in the support ofP g i . 5
Again the proof of this follows via the same kind of continuity argument as we used to prove Proposition 3.6. By definition, each group has base rate at least min i BR g i , and so if the postprocessor always says 0 on some group i, then NPV g i = BR g i ≥ min i BR g i . Hence, for each group, we can start with the always-0 classifier and slide down the threshold until the desired NPV is reached.
Finally, the socially unsatisfying example also generalizes to NPV. A privileged group will have higher scores than a disadvantaged group in general, and hence if they are given the same threshold, the NPV will be lower on the privileged group. To rectify this, the threshold for the disadvantaged group will have to moved higher, to decrease the NPV. But then, the disadvantaged group is being subjected to a harsher standard.
Finally we note that Claim 3.2 also can be written with NPV instead of PPV, where the proof follows from using the characterization of NPV given in Proposition 3.1:
Claim A.1 (Continuity of NPV). Fix a soft classifierŜ and a corresponding DOCSP, as well as a group g. LetD 1 andD 2 be two post-processing algorithms. LetP g,D 1 be the expected conditional DOCS that results from starting with the DOCSP g over scores in group g and then conditioning on the scores thatD 1 sends to 0, and defineP g,D 2 similarly. If d T V (P g,D 1 ,P g,D 2 ) < , then |NPV g,D 1 •Ŝ − NPV g,D 2 •Ŝ | < O( ).
We omit the proof of Claim A.1, which resembles the proof of Claim 3.2 and follows from Proposition 3.1.
A.2 Results for Continuous, Full Support DOCS
In this section, we briefly address how to extend our results on thresholds in Section 3 to the setting where every DOCSP is a continuous probability distribution with Supp(P g ) = [0, 1] for all g ∈ G -that is, the support equals the entire interval [0, 1] for each group g ∈ G. Note that this automatically makesP a "nice" DOCS, and hence rules out the general counterexample we came up with in Proposition 3.3. For the purposes of this section, call such a DOCS that 1)P g is a continuous probability density function for every g ∈ G and 2) Supp(P g ) = [0, 1] for all g ∈ G a very nice DOCS. As the name suggests, we can extend the remaining results in Section 3 to the setting of very nice DOCS. We give the results for equalizing PPV as done in Section 3: extending these results to equalizing NPV in the setting of continuous, full support DOCS can be accomplished by combining the statements here with the modifications described in Section A.1.
First, we note that a threshold post-processor can be described much more easily in the continuous setting than in the setting where the DOCS has finite support on each group. Indeed, in the setting whereP g is a continuous density function for all g ∈ G, the post-processor can truly be a threshold, with no question of how to classify the score that is exactly equal to the threshold τ . This is because the score τ has probability 0 under the densityP g .
Hence, Proposition 3.4 has no true analog in this setting. This follows because the maximum element of the support in this case is 1, and a threshold at τ = 1 sends every score (outside of a measure 0 set) to 0.
This allows us to strengthen Proposition 3.5 accordingly.
Proposition A.5. There exists a groupwise-calibrated soft classifier with a very nice DOCS for which no non-trivial group blind threshold post-processor can equalize PPV across groups.
This follows from a nearly identical stochastic domination argument to the one used for Proposition 3.5 -in fact, the natural generalization of the distributions given for the proof of Proposition 3.5 to the continuous and full-support setting can be used in this proof.
A non group blind threshold can still always equalize PPV for very nice DOCS.
Proposition A.6. Let G be a set of groups. For any soft classifierŜ with a very nice DOCSP such thatŜ is groupwise-calibrated over G, then there exists a non group blind, non-trivial threshold post-processor such that the hard classifier equalizes P P V across G. This holds even if we require that the PPV of all the groups is equal to an arbitrary value in (max i BR g i , 1), where max i BR g i is the maximum base rate among the groups g i ∈ G.
This follows from the same continuity approach as the proof of Proposition 3.6, by sliding the threshold continuously down from 1 until the PPV reaches the desired value v ∈ (max i BR g i , 1).
The socially unsatisfying example generalizes in the natural way -Example 3.1 consists of one group having a monotonically increasing PMF and another one having a monotonically decreasing PMF. We can skip the discretization step in the definition of these PMFs and have them be continuous PDFs, and the example still goes through.
We cannot equalize PPV and NPV simultaneously in general, just like in the finite support case (Proposition 3.7).
Proposition A.7. Fix groups g 1 and g 2 . There exists a soft classifierŜ with a very nice DOCSP such that no threshold post-processor can simultaneously equalize PPV and NPV between groups g 1 and g 2 .
The proof we give of Proposition 3.7 for finite support naturally generalizes to this case -in fact, we can simply use the same proof but without discretizing the probability distributions. The necessary lemmas about monotonicity of PPV and being able to express the base rate as a convex combination of PPV and NPV still hold.
It is unsurprising that the result in Section 5 on using thresholds with deferrals to equalize PPV and NPV also goes through for very nice DOCS.
Proposition A.8. LetŜ be groupwise calibrated for the n groups g 1 , . . . , g n , and suppose thatŜ has a very nice DOCS. Then there exists a nontrivial threshold decision rule rule such that the hard classifierŶ =D •Ŝ equalizes PPV and NPV for G.
Again, the explanation is very similar to the one for Proposition A.6. PPV and NPV change continuously when we slide the respective thresholds, and unlike the case without deferrals, we can change the PPV without changing the NPV, by keeping the "0" threshold still and sliding the "1" threshold (and deferring in the middle). Hence, we can simply continuously slide the two thresholds on each group until they reached the desired values.
